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A SIMPLIFIED CODE OF APPELLATE
PROCEDURE
L. L. BOMBERGER*
There are two primary rights involved in Appellate practice.
First, the right of appellant to be heard on the merits of his
appeal without undue procedural pitfalls; second, the right of
appellee to have a decision without unreasonable delay. While
the objective of ultimate justice between the parties is never
lost sight of, yet the approach in the reviewing court differs
from that of the trial court. It is the duty of a trial court to do
justice; it becomes the duty of a reviewing court to determine
whether justice has been done.
The vehicle by which an appellant carries his case to a re-
viewing court should never be as important as its cargo. The
energy of appellant's counsel should be devoted in the main to
presenting the merits of his cause. He should not be so vexed
by the mechanical processes of appeal as to disconcert or ex-
haust him before reaching the merits. The deliberation of coun-
sel should be given to the rights of his client, rather than to the
preparation of a transcript.
There is no reason why the appealing of a case should not be
simplified to the point where formality becomes unimportant,
or at least fully subordinated.
A radical departure from the established code of Appellate
practice is in no sense a blow at approved procedure, including
the formation of appropriate and proper issues and an orderly
trial, in the court below.
The purpose of this discussion and of the plan which is of-
fered is such that changes in the practice generally, which are
* Of the Hammond bar.
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frequently suggested and discussed, are entirely beside the point.
The subject matter is Appellate Procedure, and the object is
only to bring about such changes as will emphasize the end to be
accomplished, rather than the means.
The case is well stated by Attorney General Cummings in this
language :*
"Courts exist to vindicate and enforce substantive rights.
Procedure is merely the machinery designed to secure an orderly
presentation of legal controversies. If that machinery is so
complicated that it serves to delay justice or to entrap the un-
wary, it is not functioning properly and should be overhauled."
In order to get under way, it is probably necessary that the
legislative branch of the Government withdraw from its inva-
sion of the prerogatives of the judiciary by conceding that the
subject matter is an appropriate one for rules of court, rather
than statutes.
To that end, a legislative enactment is suggested:
Section 1. Appeals from judgments in civil actions, which
are now or may hereafter be allowed by law, shall be taken un-
der such rules as to the time and manner thereof, including the
procedure in both the trial courts and the courts of review, as
shall be prescribed and adopted by the Supreme Court.
Section 2. Such rules, when adopted, shall have the force of
law, and shall, to the extent and scope thereof, supercede stat-
utes now applicable to the subject matter, and such superseded
statutes are hereby repealed as of the date when such rules
take effect.
That the foregoing or a similar statute is appropriate needs
no other proof than a review of the manner in which the Su-
preme Court has handled admissions to the Bar. When the
Act of 1931 was enacted, the court immediately made an inten-
sive study of the question, adopted a comprehensive set of rules
for examination of candidates, and appointed and put to work a
Board of Examiners of the highest type. Upon this subject,
Indiana has been definitely raised to a position of high respect
and credit among the states. An opportunity now awaits her to
* Am. Bar Assoc. Jour., April, 1934.
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acquire some distinction in the modification of Appellate prac-
tice.
It is highly discreditable to this or any other state that it is
possible, and on the average, probably more than lived up to,
for an appellant to have at least eight (8) months' time elapse
between the return of a verdict and the filing of his brief in the
court of review. The statute allows thirty (30) days for the
filing of a motion for new trial. It may be assumed that such
motion is not ruled on within thirty (30) days, then follows
thirty (30) days for filing an appeal bond, sixty (60) days
thereafter for filing a transcript in the reviewing court, thirty
(30) days for submission, and finally sixty (60) days for appel-
lant's brief. In the rules that are herein proposed, this unrea-
sonable delay will be reduced to ninety (90) days. Even this
may be reduced somewhat when the Bench and Bar are able to
make further breaks with tradition.
In general, the proposed rules will establish procedure as
follows:
Within twenty days after verdict or decision, the losing party
must file in the trial court his assignment of errors, which will
be much in the form of the present motion for new trial. It
will not be necessary to include a formal prayer for relief. The
assignment of errors will set proceedings in motion automatic-
ally. Within ten days after an assignment of errors has been
filed, the trial court may, for any reason, grant a new trial. If
no new trial is granted, judgment shall be entered and the ap-
peal allowed. Twenty days will be the limit for filing an appeal
bond. The appellant will have thirty days after the appeal is
granted to prepare and file his record. Under extraordinary cir-
cumstances, he may get an extension for presenting his bill of
exceptions to the trial court, but this will not prevent his filing
in the court of review such parts of the record as are then
available. Twenty days after filing the record in the reviewing
court, the appellant's brief is to be filed. Extensions of time
will be rarely granted, and only for exceptional reasons.
This proposal is made upon the assumption that when a
case once reaches judgment in the trial court, further proceed-
ings therein should have preference on the program of the inter-
ested attorneys. Unless this principle is permitted to permeate
Appellate practice, unreasonable delays will still prevail.
It will be observed that generally there has been all the delay
in the trial court which either party may reasonably ask. This
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applies particularly to the one who is ascertained to be in the
wrong. Once it has been determined in the court below that a
party to litigation has certain rights, then, whoever thereafter
desires to resist the enforcement of such rights or obtain a re-
view of the judgment, should be required to use all reasonable
promptness in having the adverse ruling reviewed.
Moreover, it should not be made possible for the appellant to
obtain the delays that are necessarily characteristic of appeals
without adequate protection to the appellee. Therefore, there
should be no vacation appeal. Certainly the statute now per-
mitting vacation appeals within one hundred eighty days is
archaic and unreasonable, resulting only in opportunity to em-
barrass an opponent, particularly when titles to real estate are
involved, with probable loss to the successful party, for which
there is no redress.
For many years the statute has provided that appeals from
the Industrial Board are submitted at once, and that no exten-
sions of time for filing briefs may be granted. While this stat-
ute is probably an invasion of the judicial branch, and therefore
of at least doubtful validity, it has been accepted and acted upon
by the Bench and Bar-a most significant indication of the abil-
ity to perform, when there is present the necessity to perform.
There is no apparent reason why all litigants should not receive,
by rule of court, the same prompt attention to their cause as is
now mandatory in behalf of injured employees.
The proposed rules relate only to civil cases.
Rules
RULE 1.
As used herein "Reviewing Court" means the Supreme and
Appellate Courts; "Trial Court" means any inferior court from
which appeals may be taken to a reviewing court; "Judgment"
means any order, decision or judgment from which an appeal
may be taken.
RuLE 2
Within twenty days after the return of a verdict or the entry
of a finding or decision, in the trial court, any party aggrieved
thereby and desiring to appeal therefrom, shall file in the clerk's
office of such court an assignment of errors, including therein,
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separately numbered, every alleged error which it is desired to
present to the reviewing court, setting forth those occurring
before and after trial, as well as upon the trial. A ruling of the
trial court subsequent to the entry of judgment may be presented
by a supplemental assignment of errors filed within five days
after the entry of such ruling. No question not embiaced in the
assignment of errors will be considered by the reviewing court.
Motion in arrest of judgment or for judgment non obstante vere-
dicto shall be filed within five days after the verdict or decision,
in which case the time herein fixed for filing assignment of er-
rors shall be enlarged as of course to include the time elapsing
between the return of the verdict and the ruling of the trial
court on such motion, but such motion shall be ruled upon within
ten days of the filing thereof.
The present code of practice on appeal is built upon the
theory that procedure and practice in the trial court should be
repeated above. The assignment of errors is frequently called
the pleading of the appellant. There is no substantial reason for
a pleading on appeal. This rule proposes to avoid the difficul-
ties that so often beset the appellant in the preparation of an
assignment of errors. All questions of what is a so-called inde-
pendent error, and whether a certain assignment should be in-
cluded in a motion for new trial, will be eliminated. Therefore,
that much of counsel's energy can be devoted to the merits of the
case.
The proposed plan is substantially that of the Federal courts.
Each assignment of error is an independent one and should be
so definite and specific as to inform not only the reviewing court,
but the trial court as well, of the alleged errors complained of.
It will be noted that rulings on pleadings must be in the assign-
ment of errors. The trial court may examine the assignment of
errors, if he so choose, may hear argument thereon, and if con-
vinced of the necessity of so doing, may grant a new trial. If he
does not, the case is automatically ready for judgment and prep-
aration for appeal at the end of ten days. It is respectfully sub-
mitted that a case that has been tried should have the right of
way in the trial court as well as in the attorney's office, and that
it should not be tied up indefinitely, as so frequently happens by
failure to rule on a motion for new trial. Both trial courts and
the interested attorneys should act upon the principle that a
case that has proceeded to a verdict or decision is unfinished and
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should have preference over other business that has not pro-
gressed to that stage.
It will be noted that by a subsequent rule (Rule 5), the clerk
below certifies the assignment of errors in the record, and the
matter is then before the reviewing court without the necessity
of any further pleading therein and without the risk and anxiety
that parties now encounter by failure to name all parties cor-
rectly. All parties to the judgment are to be bound by the ap-
peal. (Rule 9.)
RULE 3
The trial court shall have ten days after the filing of the as-
signment of errors to grant a new trial for any cause; failure so
to rule shall be equivalent to a denial thereof, and thereupon
judgment shall be entered on the motion of the prevailing party.
The aggrieved party may, within five days thereafter, file a
prayer for appeal and a praecipe for such parts of the record as
he shall desire therefor. The court shall grant the appeal and
fix the penalty of the appeal bond and name the approved sure-
ties thereon. The court shall also at such time allow time for
presenting bills of exceptions.
This proposed rule will probably be criticized for the compara-
tively short time allowed the trial court to determine whether
or not he has committed a reversible error, but again the car-
dinal principle must be borne in mind that it is the duty of both
court and counsel, once a man's rights have been determined, to
proceed with diligence to finish the job. Moreover, it may be ob-
served that a trial judge is probably better able to dispose of
alleged errors on the trial within ten days, than he is likely to be
after any greater lapse of time.
RULE 4
Appeal bonds must be filed within twenty days and bills of ex-
ceptions presented within thirty days after the allowance of the
appeal. The trial court may, upon a verified showing, enlarge
or extend the time for presenting bills of exceptions as now pro-
vided by Chapter 114 of the Acts of Assembly, approved March
3rd, 1911.
This shortens the time for filing appeal bonds, but no good
reason has ever been discovered why a party should not get the
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preliminaries under way for a surety on his appeal bond con-
currently with the preparation of his assignment of errors, or at
least within the ten day period allowed the trial judge to grant
a new trial. It is no hardship to require the filing of an appeal
bond within twenty days after the appeal has been allowed, if
interested parties will diligently attend to the matter. Thirty
days is, in a vast majority of cases, quite sufficient time for the
preparation of a bill of exceptions. If an extraordinary situa-
tion arise, the proposed rule takes care of it by the preservation
of the Act of 1911 permitting extensions. If the bill of excep-
tions be not ready for filing with the transcript of the record,
it may be brought up by certiorari later on, and an extension of
time for filing appellant's brief be obtained for that reason.
(See Rule 15.)
RULE 5
Within ten days after the filing of the appeal bond, the clerk
of the trial court shall certify to and file in the reviewing court
a transcript of the assignment of errors, the judgment, the
prayer for and order granting the appeal and fixing the bond,
the appeal bond, the praecipe, and such other parts of the record
as are called for by the praecipe. The cause shall be docketed in
the reviewing court in the name of the party taking the appeal
as the appellant, and the opposite party as appellee. It shall
not be necessary to name more than the first appellant and the
first appellee, but shall be sufficient to refer to the others as
"and others" or "et al."
The present statute providing for appeals from interlocutory
orders appointing receivers requires that the record be filed
within ten days, and there is no reason why all other appeals
should not be prepared and fied within a like time. In actual
practice, it is well known that a transcript of the record is or-
dered immediately when the appeal is granted, sometimes before,
so that the party really has thirty days from the date of the
granting of his appeal to obtain and file a transcript of the
record.
The assignment of errors in the court below is entitled as the
cause is entitled in that court. On appeal, the clerk will name
as appellant the party assigning the error, and the opposite
party as appellee. It is sufficient to name the first appellant and
first appellee, and refer to the others "et al." No difficulty about
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the jurisdiction of the reviewing court is involved here, because
Rule 9 provides that all parties below shall be deemed to have
notice of the appeal and shall be bound thereby.
RULE 6
All proceedings provided for by Rules 2 and S may be in term
or vacation; the absence or disability of the trial judge shall not
excuse failure to take each step therein set out within the time
allowed, and to that end, any judge of the Circuit, Superior,
Criminal or Probate courts of the same or any adjoining county
may act in his place. Provided, that if the time for presenting
the bill of exceptions will expire during the absence of the trial
judge, it shall be deemed a sufficient presentation of such bill
of exceptions to file the same in the clerk's office of the trial
court, and the clerk shall certify to such presentation as the
trial judge would certify if present. Such bill of exceptions
shall remain in the clerk's office until the return of the trial
judge, who shall thereafter act upon the same, as though it had
been actually submitted to him within the time fixed.
It is necessary to provide for vacation entries in taking the
various steps for appeal, and therefore, this rule is proposed.
It is also important that the rights of parties be not prejudiced
by the absence of the trial judge. Therefore, as the matter is
more or less of a formality, at least after the ten days have
elapsed for the consideration by the trial judge of the assign-
ment of errors, there is no reason why some other judge should
not fix the appeal bond and approve the sureties. Indeed, he
might go further and approve the bill of exceptions, at least if
all parties agree that it is correct.
RULE 7
A copy of the praecipe provided for by Rule 3 shall be served
on the attorney of the opposite party on or before the filing
thereof, and such party shall have five days after service thereof
to file an additional praecipe for any other parts of the record
deemed essential to a proper consideration of the appeal. Either
party bringing unnecessary parts of the record before the re-
viewing court may be taxed the costs thereof.
All records for appeals should be based on a written praecipe,
and this proposed rule will permit the opposite party to bring
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in any parts which he feels are necessary to present the ques-
tions involved. Undoubtedly, much unnecessary matter is fre-
quently embraced in records for appeal, because of a verbal or
general praecipe.
RULE 8
The party prevailing in the trial court shall not have judg-
ment during the time allowed for filing an assignment of errors,
and after such assignment is filed there shall be a further stay
as of course until the time of granting the appeal. The allow-
ance of an appeal shall stay proceedings on the judgment, but, if
the appeal bond be not filed within the time allowed, the judg-
ment or decree may be enforced; provided, at any time after
the verdict or decision, upon the filing of a petition, verified by
the party or his counsel, and certified by counsel to be in good
faith after careful investigation made by him, and setting forth
one or more of the grounds of attachment under the statutes of
this state, and reciting in detail the facts relied upon, the trial
court shall enter judgment and shall allow the prevailing party
to proceed to satisfy the same, unless stay is taken by the giving
of surety approved by the court, to remain obligated until the
appeal bond is filed and conditioned for the payment or satis-
faction of the judgment in the event that no appeal bond is filed.
This rule is designed, first, to protect appellant from the entry
of a judgment and possible proceedings thereon during the time
he may appeal, and second, to provide the judgment creditor a
method of enforcing the judgment if extraordinary circum-
stances arise, such as the removal of the defendant or his prop-
erty from the state. This situation has occurred in actions in
tort against non-residents. The increase of motor vehicle traffic
is a potential source of opportunity for a defendant to escape.
This rule will furnish the judgment plaintiff some protection,
and certainly cannot harm any defendant, who is in good faith.
Grounds of attachment, as now embraced in the statutes, are
believed to be a fair basis for permitting acceleration of judg-
ment and execution.
RULE 9
Vacation appeals are abolished, and all parties to the pro-
ceedings below shall be deemed to have notice of the appeal, and
shall be bound thereby. It shall be sufficient to entitle the as-
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signment of errors by the full names of the first party plaintiff
and defendant respectively, referring to the others "and others,"
or by appropriate abbreviation.
By the time a case reaches judgment, either party ought to
have fairly definite intentions as to an appeal from an adverse
decision. The idea that one should be allowed six full months
to make up his mind on this subject, will seldom be found to
operate in the interests of justice, but on the other hand, is a
prolific source of irritation, uncertainty and consequent injus-
tice. Balancing the occasional situations where a vacation ap-
peal might be proper against the vast majority of situations
where it would be unjust to the prevailing party, and remem-
bering that rules must be made, as laws, in accordance with the
needs of the greater number, there is no defense for vacation
appeals, and they should be abolished.
RULE 10
No pleadings other than the assignment of errors filed in the
trial court shall be required in the court of review. The ruling
of the trial court on a motion for new trial will not be reviewed.
This proposed rule is substantially that of the Federal courts.
It is entirely workable and satisfactory as there applied, and is
a desirable short cut across formalities to get the alleged errors
before the reviewing court.
The rule will not prevent the filing of a motion for new trial,
but there is no need of such motion, because, unlike the Federal
practice, this rule would permit the trial court to consider the
assignment of errors, and if convinced of the commission of
error, to grant a new trial. This is nothing more than acting
under the inherent and time-honored right and duty of the trial
court.
RuLE 11
Where a case is decided in a trial court after change of venue
from any other court, the assignment of errors shall sufficiently
present all alleged errors in the proceedings had in any court
in which the cause was at any time pending, without naming the
court in which the error occurred; and the trial court shall
have power to set aside any ruling made in the cause by any
other court, within the ten days prescribed by Rule 3.
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Under this rule, it will be unnecessary for an appealing at-
torney to concern himself about naming the court which actually
committed the error he desires to present. This oversight has
been fatal to appeals in the past. No substantial right is invaded
by ignoring this requirement. An error should be sufficiently
presented by showing that it has occurred somewhere between
the inception of the case and the judgment.
Inasmuch as the court finally trying the case has before it
the assignment of errors, for a period of ten days, it should not
hesitate to correct error occurring before the case reached it.
RULE 12
Cross-errors may be assigned by any party to the judgment
by filing the same in the office of the Clerk of the reviewing
court not later than the time fixed for filing appellant's brief.
Assignments of cross-errors shall conform in all respects to the
rules for the preparation of assignments of errors.
This rule not only gives the appellee an opportunity to ascer-
tain what the appellant's record contains, but if he desires to
file cross-error, he may bring up, by his own praecipe (Rule 7)
sufficient additional record to present his cross-errors. Of
course, no opportunity is given the trial court to review cross-
errors, and no necessity therefor has been observed under the
present practice.
RULE 13
No document nor exhibit shall be twice copied into the record
for appeal, but it shall be sufficient for the trial court, in settling
a bill of exceptions, or the clerk, in certifying the record, to in-
clude such document or exhibit but once, and thereafter to iden-
tify by reference thereto. No bill of exceptions will be treated
as incomplete which complies with this rule. If a document or
exhibit is attached to any pleading presented to the reviewing
court, and also introduced in evidence, it shall be sufficient to
copy such exhibit or document only in the bill of exceptions con-
taining the evidence, and the clerk may make appropriate ref-
erence thereto in copying the pleadings.
This rule is designed to permit the preparation of a record in
a sensibly brief way, without taking the risk of having it re-
jected because some document has not been actually copied
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therein more than once. The idea is that if the document ap-
pears once in the bill of exceptions containing the evidence, that
should be sufficient, and it may be identified by reference, at all
other places where it appears.
RULE 14
The appellant's brief shall be filed within twenty days after
the record is filed; the appellee's brief within twenty days after
the filing of appellant's brief; the reply brief within fifteen days
after the filing of appellee's brief. Appellee's brief on cross-
errors shall be filed with his answer brief, and appellant may
file an answer brief thereto within twenty days thereafter, to
which appellee may file reply brief within fifteen days.
Copies of all briefs shall be served on opposing counsel and
no brief will be filed by the clerk of the reviewing court unless
accompanied by an acknowledgment of such brief on the part
of the opposite counsel, or a certificate by counsel offering the
brief for filing that such copy has been served personally, or by
due course of mail.
Although this rule reduces materially the time for filing
briefs, it is no more limited than the prevailing rules in such
states as New York, Wisconsin, Illinois, the Seventh Circuit
Court of Appeals, and the Supreme Court of the United States.
After all, it simply exacts of counsel the will to work and not
postpone.
The provision for service of briefs on opposing counsel will
save time in the preparation of answer and reply briefs, espe-
cially for attorneys not residing in Indianapolis, and in view of
the proposed reduction of time for filing briefs, it is logical that
opposing counsel should be served therewith on or before the
filing. Service of briefs is now required in the Supreme Court
of the United States.
RULE 15
Petitions for extensions of time to file briefs will not here-
after be granted, unless facts are stated therein showing that
the court in which the cause is pending has jurisdiction thereof
and that the brief will be on the merits of the cause. When fied
by the appellee such petition shall also show that all motions to
dismiss and all dilatory motions in the cause on behalf of the
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petitioner have been filed. Extensions will only be granted (1)
by reason of illness or other incapacity of the attorney in charge
of the preparation of the brief, (2) his actual engagement in the
trial of a cause, which trial commenced before the beginning of
the time within which such party is required to file the brief in-
volved in the petition for extension, (3) upon a showing that the
bill of exceptions, containing the evidence, was not filed with the
transcript of the record and showing when the bill was filed, in
which event twenty days' extension from the time the bill of
exceptions is brought into the reviewing court will be granted
for filing appellant's brief, (4) that such attorney is already en-
gaged in the preparation of a brief in a reviewing court of this
state or of the United States, the time for filing which will ex-
pire not later than twenty days after the expiration of the time
fixed, which he desires to have extended, (5) upon a showing that
the record is so voluminous as to render it impossible to abstract
the same and brief the points in the assignment of errors within
the time prescribed by this rule. Actual engagement in the
preparation of a brief in a reviewing court of this state or of
the United States shall be sufficient grounds for postponement
of the trial of any case, or hearing before any Board or Commis-
sion, which is in immediate charge of the attorney engaged in
preparing such brief. At least three days' notice to the adverse
party must be given of all applications for extensions of time.
This rule strikes at one of the most notorious abuses charge-
able to the Bar of this state. Everyone can recall in his own
practice multiplied illustrations of injurious delays, from the
litigant's standpoint, because of dilatory briefing. One case, of
very great and general public interest, which would have been
advanced, probably, on motion, and speedily disposed of, may be
cited. Notwithstanding the importance of this case, the appel-
lant took four months from the date of filing within which to
write his brief, and the appellee obtained several extensions and
consumed about five months.
Extensions will no longer be granted, as of course, nor by
consent of the parties. The latter custom, going under the name
of professional courtesy, has developed largely for the conveni-
ence of lawyers with little regard to the rights of clients. In-
deed, the present rule, permitting one extension without notice
to the opposite party, is tantamount to an invitation to apply
for it.
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A study made in 1931* of a group of cases in which extensions
of time had been allowed, disclosed the fact that these cases av-
eraged twelve months in their journey through the trial courts,
but the average time consumed in filing the briefs was thirteen
months. This is a highly disproportionate ratio.
While there may be a question as to the power of the Supreme
Court to compel trial courts to grant continuances where attor-
neys are engaged in writing a brief in a reviewing court, never-
theless, it might well enough be considered an abuse of
discretion to deny such an application. At least, a spirit of
co-operation in advancing appeals could readily be established
by both the Bench and Bar.
RULE 16
Application for a rehearing of any cause shall be made by
petition, separate from the briefs, signed by counsel, filed with
the clerk within twenty days from the rendition of the judg-
ment, stating concisely the cause for which the judgment is sup-
posed to be erroneous, which application shall be supported by
briefs only, with arguments set out therein, if desired. Ten
copies of the brief must be filed at the same time the petition is
filed, and one copy of the brief shall be delivered at once by the
clerk to each judge. If no petition for rehearing is filed within
the time herein fixed, the opinion and judgment shall at once
be certified to the trial court. The opposite party may file a
brief in opposition to the petition for rehearing within ten days
after the filing of such petition.
The time for petitioning for a rehearing is shortened to twenty
days. The questions in any case will be, to some extent, limited
by the opinion handed down by the reviewing court, so that it
is improbable that any considerable number of points may be
worth bringing up on a petition for rehearing. Indeed, it would
seem to be unwise to attempt a restatement of merely doubtful
questions, but if there is an outstanding question worthy of pre-
sentation for rehearing, attention can be concentrated upon it
and the work done, well within the twenty days allowed. Ten
days should be sufficient to answer a petition for rehearing.
* VII Ind. Law Journal 341.
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RULE 17
An application to transfer a cause from the Appellate Court
to the Supreme Court shall be filed within fifteen (15) days
after a petition for rehearing has been overruled, and shall set
forth (1) that the Appellate Court has decided the case, or some
material part thereof, against the party who asks that it be
transferred, (2) that a written opinion setting forth the rea-
sons on which such judgment was based was filed by the Appel-
late Court, giving the date when it was filed, (3) that the Appel-
late Court overruled a petition for rehearing duly presented by
such party within the time allowed, stating on what date it was
overruled; and having thus shown the jurisdiction, the petition
(4) shall particularly and specifically and without argument
point out what there is in the opinion of the Appellate Court
which contravenes a ruling precedent of the Supreme Court, or
which erroneously decides a new question of law, indicating the
ruling precedent, or concisely stating the new question of law,
referred to. Such petition (5) shall be signed by the petitioner
or by his attorney. (6) If briefs are filed, they shall be separate
from and filed with the petition; but they shall not be necessary
to invoke the action of the court on the petition. Parties op-
posing a transfer may file briefs within twenty-five (25) days
after the ruling on the petition for rehearing.
If a rehearing is denied in the Appellate Court, fifteen days is
allowed for filing a petition for transfer. In the average case,
the unsuccessful party is about at the end of his rope, if the Ap-
pellate Court denies a rehearing. If there is anything left, it
certainly is a very narrow issue, only two questions being per-
mitted as a basis for a petition to transfer and prompt action
may reasonably be demanded.
RULE 18
This rule would be the present Rule 21 concerning preparation
of appellant's brief, with these additions: (1) The brief should
include an index of cases, referring to each page of the brief
where a case is cited. (2) An index should be a part of every
brief. (3) Some improvement may be made in the method of
citing cases: (a) where a practice question is presented and
regarded as settled in Indiana, but one authority, the latest
known to the party, may be cited; (b) in citing Indiana cases,
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the official citation must be given if available, and the last cases
known to the party shall be cited first; (c) where authorities
outside of Indiana are cited, all citations known to the party, in-
cluding selected case systems, will be required. Counsel will ar-
range their authorities in the order of their reliance upon them
(this suggestion is patterned somewhat after Rule 22 of the
U. S. Cir. Ct. of App. 7th Cir). (4) It is suggested that the
first page of a brief should be a statement of legal propositions
involved, without mention of parties, dates or amounts, but
wholly in the abstract. This rule had its origin in Pennsylvania,
where it is known as Rule 50 of the Supreme Court. It is rigidly
enforced in that state, to the benefit of both counsel and the
court.*
An examination of many briefs filed in the Supreme and Ap-
pellate Courts of this state leads one to the conclusion that had
counsel been required to state at the outset the questions involved,
as they are stated in Pennsylvania and other states that have
adopted the rule, such briefs, instead of being merely a recepta-
cle for all sorts of long range suggestions, which are evidently
thrown in with the hope of making something stick, would pre-
sent a comparatively limited number of substantial questions.
That such a change would materially aid the court and conse-
quently speed up its work is self-evident. A reviewing judge,
taking up a brief prepared as proposed, would instantly have a
comprehensive view of the issues involved, and in a vast ma-
jority of cases an impression as to the correctness of the dispo-
sition of them by the trial court.
Many times the Bar has been admonished by judges of review-
ing courts that the statement of the case is of the utmost im-
portance. Indeed, it is hardly an exaggeration to say that a case
well stated is half won. Moreover, the discipline in concentra-
tion and expression which will be a concomitant of this rule
will be of value to attorneys engaged in briefing cases, and tend
to a gradual raising of the quality of briefs.
RULE 19
This would be the present Rule 22 concerning appellee's brief.
If the substance of Pennsylvania Rule 50 is adopted concerning
* 34 Yale L. J. 287. This Rule has been adopted in California, Florida,
Kentucky, Michigan, North Carolina and South Carolina. Jud. C. of Mich.
3rd Rep. June, 1933, p. 240.
CODE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE
appellant's briefs, then the rule for appellee's brief should per-
mit a counter-statement of the propositions involved. With that
amendment, present Rule 22 could be used.
RULE 20
This would restate the present Rule 23 concerning arguments
in briefs.
RULE 21
This concerns the mechanical make-up of a brief and should
be a re-statement of present Rule 24.
RULE 22
This could re-state present Rule 25 concerning amendments.
The present rules as to oral arguments (Rules 26, 27 and 28),
as to possession and removal of records (Rules 30 and 31),
docketing and distribution of cases (Rule 32), certiorari (Rule
34), the Supreme Court Reporter (Rule 38, except as to the
sixty-day provision), withdrawal papers (Rule 39), would not
be disturbed by this proposal.
RLLE 23
Unless otherwise provided in these rules, notice shall mean
written notice to the opposite party by service upon his counsel
prior to the filing of any petition, pleading or brief.
This provision is substantially that of the Federal law con-
cerning notice of petition for removal of causes. In view of the
purpose of the entire proposal to expedite procedure, there is no
appreciable reason for the conventional ten days or other ex-
tended period of notice.
RULE 24
These Rules shall take effect on the - day of - , 1935,
and shall thereafter apply to all cases in which a verdict or de-
cision is rendered subsequent to said date. So much of these
Rules as concerns the preparation of briefs and the time for fil-
ing the same shall apply to all briefs which become due after the
taking effect of these Rules, but all appeals filed after the said
- day of - , 1935, shall be immediately submitted and Rule
14 applied thereto.
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Inasmuch as these rules contemplate changes in the trial
courts as well as in the reviewing courts, they should not take
effect at once in both courts. Ample time will doubtless be given
before the rules are made effective as to proceedings in the trial
courts, but with respect to the reviewing courts, it is appropriate
to apply the rules to briefs that become due after a date to be
fixed by the court.
Delays in court procedure are discussed at every important
meeting of the Bar, in every influential law journal, and in
nearly every issue, criticized by laymen, and placidly tolerated
and enhanced by the Bar. Warnings without number by presi-
dents of associations and prominent speakers, that our very live-
lihood is imperiled, that our work as advocates in courts is being
constantly and consistently shifted to bureaus and commissions,
do not bestir us.
The case from the layman standpoint is succinctly put in an
editorial recently appearing in a national magazine that claims
millions of readers :*
"Bench and bar should be given a fair chance and a free hand
to reconstruct our court procedure along lines that will lead to
speedy trials and fair and reasonable court costs. If they fail,
they cannot complain if the job is taken out of their hands and
put into more competent ones."
We fiddle in the face of approaching conflagration, with this
distinction from the ancient prototype, that not only will the
fires of, disgust and impatience, fed by hostile and irrational
legislation, consume the rights committed to our care, but like-
wise threaten the perpetuation of our profession itself in its
honorable station in society.
This is not a "reform" measure; the word is offensive to
most of us. It is simply a suggestion that there may be, from
the standpoint of our clients, a better way of conducting appeals.
The writer has not gone as far from beaten paths as he feels
inclined to go, and certainly not as far as ultimately the Bench
and Bar will determine to go, but it is certain that we must get
under way.
The purpose motivating the submission of this proposition
can be no better stated than by adopting the language of Pro-
* Saturday Evening Post, April 14, 1934.
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fessor Cain in his admirable article on "Congested Dockets and
Measures for Relief."* He says:
"It is the sole purpose of the author of this article to con-
tribute something to the making of a Judicial Establishment that
will invite instead of repel, that will be a beneficent, not a cala-
mitous means for the settlement of human differences. It is in
that spirit that this is submitted, with the hope that it will bear
fruit."
* Notre Dame Lawyer, January, 1934.
